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Abstract—Secure communication over large-scale decentral-
ized wireless networks is an extremely challenging task due to the
cost and difficulty in establishing secret keys among all the nodes
in a distributed manner. For this reason, the notion of physical
layer security has recently drawn significant attention, which
may assist with key exchange and provide an additional layer of
protection in such networks. In this paper, we investigate how the
physical layer security constraints affect the network throughput.
We consider a random network in which the legitimate and
eavesdropper nodes are located according to independent Poisson
point processes. We introduce a new metric “secrecy transmission
capacity” to characterize the network throughput in terms of
the area spectral efficiency of secure transmissions, subject to
constraints on both the quality of service and the level of security.
This capacity framework allows us to quantitatively study the
throughput cost of physical layer security constraints. We observe
that the throughput cost of achieving a moderate level of security
is quite low, while throughput must be significantly sacrificed to
realize a highly secure network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a fundamental challenge in wireless networks,
and one increasing in importance as more and more computing
and sensitive communication is done through wireless devices.
Unlike encryption-based security, information-theoretic stud-
ies have showed that “perfect” secrecy can be achieved in
the physical layer by properly designing an encoder-decoder
pair, but only if the legitimate receiver has a stronger channel
than the eavesdropper [1, 2]. This has motivated a signifi-
cant recent effort on physical layer security enhancements,
including multi-antenna transmission [3–5] and cooperative
communications [6, 7]. These works have mostly focused on
systems with a small number of nodes.
Unlike point-to-point communications, the communication
between nodes in large-scale networks strongly depends on
locations of other nodes and how the nodes interact with
each other. When secrecy is added into consideration, the
locations and channel information of the eavesdroppers, which
are usually unknown, become extra parameters affecting the
network performance. Initial works on networks with physical
layer security constraints studied the connectivity [8–12],
coverage [13], and capacity scaling laws [14–16]. Specifically,
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various statistical characterizations of the existence of secure
connections were given in [8–10, 12]. Using tools from perco-
lation theory, the existence of a secrecy graph was analyzed
in [8, 10, 11]. These connectivity results are concerned with
the possibility of having secure communication, while they
do not give insight on the network throughput. The authors
in [14–16] derived secrecy capacity scaling laws in static
and mobile ad hoc networks, i.e., the order-of-growth of the
secrecy capacity as the number of nodes increases. Although
the scaling laws may provide insights into the information-
theoretic performance of large-scale networks, a finer view of
throughput is necessary to better understand the impact of key
system parameters and transmission protocols, since most of
these design choices affect the throughput but not the scaling
behaviors [17].
In this work, we aim to characterize the throughput of secure
communications in decentralized wireless networks and to
understand how the physical layer security requirements affect
the network throughput. Our approach uses a metric termed the
transmission capacity [18], which provides the area spectral
efficiency (ASE) of decentralized networks with random topol-
ogy, identical nodes, and a constraint on outage probability.
We extend this capacity framework to study the impact of the
security requirements on the network ASE. The network con-
sidered have both legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, whose
locations follow homogeneous Poisson point processes (PPPs).
We define the secrecy transmission capacity as the achievable
rate of successful transmission of confidential messages per
unit area for given constraints on the quality of service (QoS)
and the level of security. The QoS constraint is given by the
outage probability of the transmission between a legitimate
transmitter-receiver pair, while the security constraint is given
by the probability of a transmission failing to achieve perfect
secrecy.
To illustrate the use of the general capacity formulation, we
derive an accurate closed-form lower bound on the secrecy
transmission capacity for Rayleigh fading channels. This sim-
ple capacity bound quantitatively characterizes the dependence
of the network throughput on the key system parameters,
i.e., the densities of legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers, as
well as the QoS and security constraints. Specifically, we
find that the throughput reduction for achieving a moderate
level of security is relatively small, while a significant amount
of throughput needs to be sacrificed to realize a highly
secure network. We also give a condition for transmission
of confidential messages whilst satisfying both constraints. It
turns out that the QoS and security constraints as well as the
density of eavesdroppers are crucial in determining whether
transmission is allowed, while the density of legitimate nodes
is irrelevant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model and the secrecy transmission capac-
ity formulation. In Section III, we obtain analytical results on
the secrecy transmission capacity in Rayleigh fading channels.
Numerical results are presented in Section IV and concluding
remarks in Section V. A summary of the notation used in this
paper is given in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CAPACITY FORMULATION
We consider an ad hoc network consisting of both legitimate
nodes and eavesdroppers over a large two-dimensional space.
For each snapshot in time, we have a set of legitimate transmit-
ter locations, denoted by Φl.1 Each transmitter has a unique
associated intended receiver. The set of receivers is disjoint
with the set of transmitters. In addition, we have a set of eaves-
dropper locations in each snapshot, denoted by Φe. We model
Φl and Φe as independent homogeneous PPPs with densities λl
and λe, respectively. This is a suitable model for decentralized
networks with nodes having substantial mobility [19]. Note
that the eavesdroppers need to have similar mobility and other
behaviors as the legitimate nodes since they can be easily
identified otherwise [15]. Furthermore, we assume that the
eavesdroppers do not collude with each other and, hence, must
decode the confidential messages individually.
Consider a single active transmitter that wants to send
confidential messages to its intended receiver in the presence
of the eavesdroppers. Secure encoding schemes, such as the
Wyner code [1], were found in point-to-point systems with
the notion of weak secrecy. According to Wyner’s encoding
scheme, the transmitter chooses two rates, namely, the rate of
the transmitted codewords Rt and the rate of the confidential
messages Rs. The rate difference Re = Rt − Rs reflects
the cost of securing the messages against eavesdropping. If
Rt is less than the mutual information between the channel
input and output of the legitimate link, the receiver is able to
decode the message with an arbitrarily small error. At the same
time, if Re is larger than the mutual information between the
channel input and output of every eavesdropper link (i.e., links
from the transmitter to every eavesdropper), perfect secrecy is
achieved as the mutual information between the confidential
message and every eavesdropper’s received signal approaches
zero ratewise. A detailed description of the Wyner code can
be found in [1, 20, 21].
In an ad hoc network with simultaneous transmissions from
infinitely many legitimate transmitters, it is difficult to study
1For networks employing a slotted Aloha protocol, Φl can be viewed as
the locations of the actual transmitters (out of all potential transmitters) in
each time slot.
TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATION
Φl Poisson point process (PPP) of legitimate transmitter locations
Φe PPP of eavesdropper locations
λl Density of Φl
λe Density of Φe
Rt Rate of the transmitted codewords
Rs Rate of the confidential messages
Re Rate loss for securing the messages against eavesdropping
Pco Connection outage probability
Pso Secrecy outage probability
σ Constraint on Pco
 Constraint on Pso
r Distance between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair
τ Secrecy transmission capacity
βt Threshold signal to interference ratio (SIR) for connection outage
βe Threshold SIR for secrecy outage
S Rayleigh fading gain of the wireless channel
P(.) Probability measure
E{.} Expectation operator
the mutual information between an arbitrary pair of nodes.
To make the design and analysis mathematically tractable,
we assume that the transmitted signal (i.e., channel input)
has a Gaussian distribution and both the intended receivers
and the eavesdroppers treat the interference from concurrent
transmissions as noise. In addition, we assume that the network
is interference-limited, hence, the receiver noise is negligible.
With these assumptions, the mutual information or capacity
of either a legitimate link or an eavesdropper link is now
determined by the instantaneous signal to interference ratio
(SIR). For any given choices of Rt and Rs in Wyner’s
encoding scheme, the following outage events can result from
any transmission [21]:
• Connection Outage: The capacity of the channel from
the transmitter to the intended receiver is below the trans-
mission rate Rt. Hence, the message cannot be correctly
decoded by the intended receiver. The probability of this
event happening is referred to as the connection outage
probability, denoted as Pco.
• Secrecy Outage: The capacity of the channel from the
transmitter to one or more eavesdroppers is above the rate
Re. Hence, the message is not perfectly secure against
eavesdropping. The probability of this event happening
is referred to as the secrecy outage probability, denoted
as Pso.
The connection outage probability can be regarded as the
communication QoS while the secrecy outage probability gives
a measure of the security level.
A. Secrecy Transmission Capacity
The primary goal of this work is to characterize the
throughput of secure transmissions in decentralized wireless
networks. Although it is extremely difficult to find the network
capacity region, the idea of transmission capacity proposed
in [18] often gives useful insights on the network ASE and
the impacts of the key system parameters. Building on the
existing transmission capacity framework, we define the se-
crecy transmission capacity as the achievable rate of successful
transmission of confidential messages per unit area, for a
given connection outage constraint and a given secrecy outage
constraint. Mathematically, the secrecy transmission capacity,
with a connection outage probability of Pco = σ and a secrecy
outage probability of Pso = , is defined as
τ = R¯s(1− σ)λl, (1)
where R¯s is the average rate of confidential messages over all
legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs. The rate of confidential
messages of a particular transmitter-receiver pair depends
on the transmit power and distance. We focus on a simple
scenario where the transmit power of all the legitimate nodes
is fixed to the same value. In this paper, we also assume that
all the transmitter-receiver pairs have equal distance denoted
as r. This assumption is often adopted in the transmission
capacity literature, e.g., [18, 19]. Consequently, the secrecy
transmission capacity can be written as
τ(r) = Rs(1− σ)λl. (2)
where Rs is a function of r. Note that Rs = Rt − Re is
also a function of the connection outage and secrecy outage
constraints: The connection outage constraint σ determines the
value of Rt, while the secrecy outage constraint  determines
the value of Re. Whenever Rs is computed to be negative,
transmission is not possible and Rs is effectively zero. When
transmission is possible with these choices of rates for the
Wyner code, the probability that a message transmission can
be successfully decoded by the intended receiver is 1 − σ,
while the probability that a message transmission is perfectly
secure against eavesdropping is 1− .
If one allows the distances between the legitimate
transmitter-receiver pairs to be different and follow some
distribution f(r), the secrecy transmission capacity can be
computed by averaging over f(r). Since in practice the
distribution of r depends on specific scenarios, we do not
consider the variation in r and focus on characterizing τ(r)
in this paper.
III. SECRECY TRANSMISSION CAPACITY IN RAYLEIGH
FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we derive analytical results on the secrecy
transmission capacity for Rayleigh fading channels. We as-
sume that each node has a single antenna for transmission
or reception, and the fading channel states are known at the
receiver side (including the eavesdroppers) but not at the
transmitter side. The derivation of the secrecy transmission
capacity involves two main steps: 1) Use the connection outage
constraint σ to find the value of Rt. 2) Use the secrecy outage
constraint  to find the value of Re.
Our analysis is based on an arbitrarily chosen transmitter-
receiver pair, which are named the typical transmitter and
receiver. For confidential message transmission from the typ-
ical transmitter, the other transmitters act as interferers to the
typical receiver or any eavesdropper. From Slivnyak’s Theo-
rem [22], the spatial distribution of the interferers, given the
location of the typical transmitter, still follows a homogeneous
PPP with density λl. By slight abuse of notation (since we have
used Φl to denote the set of all transmitter locations), we will
also refer to Φl as the set of interferer locations in the rest of
this paper.
For the typical receiver, a connection outage occurs if
log2(1 + SIR0) < Rt, where SIR0 denotes the SIR at the
typical receiver given by
SIR0 =
S0r
−α∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α
, (3)
where S0 and r are the channel fading gain and the distance
between the typical transmitter and receiver, respectively, α is
the path loss exponent, Sl and |Xl| are the channel fading gain
and the distance between the interferer (at position) l in Φl and
the typical receiver, respectively. We assume α > 2 throughout
this paper. The fading gains are modeled as independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) exponential random variables
with unit mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for connection outage as
βt = 2
Rt − 1. (4)
Hence, the connection outage probability can be written as
Pco = P
(
SIR0 < βt
)
= P
(
S0r
−α∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α
< βt
)
. (5)
The summation term
∑
l∈Φl Sl|Xl|−α is a shot noise pro-
cess [23] in two-dimensional space whose Laplace transform
is known in a closed form and was used to compute the
connection outage probability in [24] as
Pco = 1− exp
[
−λlpir2β2/αt Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
. (6)
With the connection outage constraint given by Pco = σ,
the transmission rate Rt can be found using (4) and (6) as
Rt = log2
1 + [ ln 11−σ
λlpir2Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
)]α2
 . (7)
It is clear that a lower connection outage probability (i.e., a
higher QoS) requires a lower Rt.
On the other hand, the confidential message transmission is
not perfectly secure against the eavesdropper (at position) e in
Φe if log2(1 + SIRe) > Re, where SIRe denotes the SIR at e
given by
SIRe =
Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
, (8)
where Se and |Xe| are the channel fading gain and the distance
between the typical transmitter and eavesdropper e in Φe,
respectively, Sle and |Xle| are the channel fading gain and
the distance between node l in Φl and eavesdropper e in Φe,
respectively. The fading gains are modeled as i.i.d. exponential
random variables with unit mean.
Define a threshold SIR value for secrecy outage as
βe = 2
Re − 1. (9)
Let A = {y ∈ Φe : SIRy > βe}, i.e., the set of eavesdroppers
that can cause secrecy outage. Hence, we can define the
following indicator function: 1A(e), which equals 1 when the
eavesdropper e is in the set A. The secrecy outage probability
equals the probability that at least one of the eavesdroppers in
Φe causes a secrecy outage, which can be written as
Pso = 1− EΦl
{
EΦe
{
ES
{ ∏
e∈Φe
(
1− 1A(e)
)}}}
,
= 1− EΦl
{
EΦe
{
∏
e∈Φe
(
1− P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
∣∣∣Φe,Φl))}}.
(10)
where the independence in the fading gains among different
eavesdroppers is used to move the expectation over S =
{Se, Sle} inside the product over Φe in (10). Since it is difficult
to express Pso in a closed form, we resort to analytical bounds
on the secrecy outage probability. The results are summarized
in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: The secrecy outage probability is bounded from
above by
PUBso = 1− exp
− λe
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
)
 , (11)
and bounded from below by
PLBso =
1
1 + λlλe β
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
) . (12)
Proof: Using the generating functional of the PPP Φe [22],
we can express the secrecy outage probability in (10) as
Pso = 1− EΦl
{
exp
[
− λe
∫
R2
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
∣∣∣Φl)de]}.
(13)
Jensen’s inequality gives an upper bound on Pso
Pso ≤ 1− exp
[
− λe
∫
R2
P
( Se|Xe|−α∑
l∈Φl Sle|Xle|−α
> βe
)
de
]
= 1− exp
[
− 2piλe
·
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−λlpir2eβ2/αe Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
redre
]
,
(14)
where re denotes the distance between the typical transmitter
and eavesdropper e, (14) is arrived in the same way as (6)
followed by changing to polar coordinates. The upper bound
in (11) is then obtained by directly evaluating the integral in
(14).
The lower bound on Pso is obtained by considering only
the eavesdropper nearest to the typical transmitter. Denote the
eavesdropper (location) in Φe that is nearest to the typical
transmitter as e′ and denote the distance between e′ and the
typical transmitter as re′ . The probability distribution of re′ is
given by [25]
f(re′) = 2λepire′ exp(−λepir2e′). (15)
The secrecy outage probability is bounded from below by
the probability that the nearest eavesdropper causes a secrecy
outage, i.e.,
Pso ≥
∫ ∞
0
P
( Se′r−αe′∑
l∈Φl Sle′ |Xle′ |−α
> βe
)
f(re′)dre′
=
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−λlpir2e′β2/αe Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1 +
2
α
)]
·2λepire′ exp(−λepir2e′)dre′ . (16)
The lower bound in (12) is then obtained by directly evaluating
the integral in (16). 
Note that the authors in [26] used the same bounding
techniques to derive analytical bounds on the probability of
connectivity in a different network scenario and numerically
studied the accuracy of the derived bounds. From the numer-
ical illustration in [26, Fig. 5], we know that the upper bound
PUBso in (11) gives an accurate approximation of the exact
secrecy outage probability over the entire range of Pso ∈ [0, 1],
while the lower bound PLBso in (12) is usually very different
from the exact value of Pso. Moreover, both PUBso and P
LB
so
are asymptotically tight in the low probability regime. To see
this, we consider PUBso ≈ 0 and PLBso ≈ 0, in which case the
bounds in (11) and (12) can be approximated by
PUBso ≈
λe
λlβ
2/α
e Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1 + 2α
) ≈ PLBso . (17)
Hence, both PUBso and P
LB
so approach the exact value of Pso in
the low probability regime.
Recall that the goal here is to determine the value of Re
from the secrecy outage constraint of Pso = . Using the upper
bound on the secrecy outage probability in (11), the value of
Re that guarantees the required security level can be found as
Re = log2
(
1+
[ λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
Γ
(
1+
2
α
)
ln
1
1−
]−α2 )
. (18)
It is clear that a lower secrecy outage probability (i.e., a higher
security level) requires a higher Re.
Having Rt in (7) and Re in (18), we compute the rate of
confidential messages as Rs = [Rt − Re]+, where [z]+ =
max{0, z}. Hence, a lower bound on the secrecy transmission
capacity is obtained as τLB(r) = Rs(1 − σ)λl, which is
presented in the following theorem:
Theorem 1: A lower bound on the secrecy transmission
capacity with a connection outage constraint of σ and a
secrecy outage constraint of  is given by
τLB(r) = (1− σ)λl
·
log2
 1 +
[
ln 11−σ
λlpir2Γ(1− 2α )Γ(1+ 2α )
]α
2
1+
[
λl
λe
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ
(
1+ 2α
)
ln 11−
]−α2


+
.
(19)
From our discussion on the accuracy of PUBso , we know
that the lower bound on the secrecy transmission capacity in
(19) is generally accurate for any values of σ and , and is
asymptotically tight as → 0. Therefore, we will for simplicity
refer to τLB(r) in (19) as the secrecy transmission capacity in
the rest of this paper. It is clear from (19) that τLB(r) reduces
as  decreases. The reduction in τLB(r) as  decreases can
be viewed as the throughput cost of improving physical layer
security.
In practical network design, the connection outage con-
straint and the spatial transmission intensity2 may be under
the control of the system designer. The derived closed-form
characterization of the secrecy transmission capacity allows
the designer to optimize these system parameters to maximize
the throughput of secure transmissions with a target security
level.
A. Condition for Transmission
A fundamental question to ask is the condition under which
transmission is allowed whilst still satisfying the QoS and
security constraints. From the expression in (19), one can find
a sufficient condition for transmission by solving τLB(r) > 0:
Corollary 1: For a connection outage constraint of σ and a
secrecy outage constraint of , secure transmission is possible
when
ln
1
1− σ ln
1
1−  > pir
2λe. (20)
In other words, transmission is possible if the average number
of eavesdroppers within a distance r from the transmitter
(i.e., having shorter distances than the intended receiver) is less
than ln 11−σ ln
1
1− .
Remark 1: The condition in (20) clearly gives a trade-off
between the QoS and the security level of a network: The QoS
needs to be compromised (i.e., allowing a larger value of σ)
in order to achieve a higher security level (i.e., a smaller value
of ). Therefore, a moderate connection outage probability is
usually desirable for highly secure networks. Furthermore, the
feasible range of σ can be found from (20) as
σ ∈
(
1− exp
[
−pir
2λe
ln 11−
]
, 1
)
. (21)
2In networks employing an Aloha protocol, the spatial transmission inten-
sity equals the density of potential transmitters multiplied by the probability
of transmission. In this case, the system designer may control the probability
of transmission to vary the spatial transmission intensity.
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Fig. 1. The region in which transmission is allowed. Results are
shown for networks with different densities of eavesdroppers, i.e.,λe =
0.005, 0.001, 0.0005. The curves are plotted based on the relationship be-
tween the connection outage probability σ and the secrecy outage probability
 given in (20). The transmission distance is r = 1.
Remark 2: The condition for transmission does not depend
on the spatial transmission intensity λl. That is to say, one
cannot enable transmission simply by bringing in additional
legitimate users or deactivating existing legitimate users, if the
required connection outage and secrecy outage performances
of the network do not meet the condition in (20).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present numerical results to show the
interplay of different system parameters and their effects on
the secrecy transmission capacity.
The feasible regions of the connection outage probability σ
and the secrecy outage probability  in which transmission at
a positive rate is allowed are illustrated in Fig. 1. In general, it
is impossible to have arbitrarily low outage probabilities while
still operating at some positive secrecy transmission capacity.
The boundary lines shown in the figure illustrate the trade-
off between the QoS and security performance as discussed
in Remark 1 in Section III-A. For example, a connection
outage probability of at least σ = 0.27 is required to enable
transmission in a network with a security requirement of
 = 0.01 and an eavesdropper density of λe = 0.001.
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in
(19) versus the spatial transmission intensity λl with different
security requirements. Comparing between the four curves,
we see that the gap in τLB(r) between  = 1 and  = 0.05 is
relatively small over a wide range of λl. This suggests that the
throughput cost of achieving a moderate security requirement
is relatively low. On the other hand, τLB(r) drops dramatically
as  decreases towards 0. For example, there is a 84% reduction
in τLB(r) for improving the security level from  = 0.02 to
 = 0.01 at λl = 0.01. This reflects a significant increase in
the throughput cost of achieving highly secure networks.
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Fig. 2. The secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in (19) versus the density
of legitimate transmitters λl. Results are shown for networks with different
secrecy outage constraints, i.e.,  = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, as well as no secrecy
constraint, i.e.,  = 1. The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4,
σ = 0.3, and λe = 0.001.
For each curve in Fig. 2, we see that the optimal value of
λl is generally much larger than λe. This suggests that it is
desirable to have a significantly larger number of legitimate
nodes than the number of eavesdroppers in the network, which
creates a high level of interference to mask the confidential
message transmissions against eavesdropping. Furthermore,
the optimal value of λl increases as  decreases. For example,
the optimal λl is 0.04 for  = 0.05, while it increases to 0.051
for  = 0.02 and to 0.068 for  = 0.01.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in
(19) versus the connection outage probability σ with dif-
ferent security requirements. Again, the feasible range of σ
for positive secrecy transmission capacity never reaches 0,
which agrees with the result in (21). We see that a moderate
connection outage probability is desirable for achieving high
secrecy transmission capacity. Furthermore, the optimal value
of σ increases as  reduces. This is because that a larger
Re is needed for a stronger security requirement, in which
case larger Rt and (hence) σ are desirable for maximizing the
secrecy transmission capacity. For example, the optimal σ is
0.4 for  = 0.05 while it increases to 0.5 for  = 0.02 and to
0.6 for  = 0.01.
The numerical results in Figs. 2 and 3 quantitatively showed
the throughput cost of physical layer security constraints,
from which we see the need for transmission protocols that
significantly reduce the throughput cost of achieving high
security. Since insecure transmission is mainly due to the
presence of eavesdroppers close to the transmitter, the idea
of guard zone becomes appropriate for avoiding high-risk
transmissions and was studied in the journal version of this
paper [27]. This protocol requires the transmitters to detect the
presence of eavesdroppers within their guard zones. Message
transmission only happens if no eavesdropper is found.
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Fig. 3. The secrecy transmission capacity τLB(r) in (19) versus the
connection outage probability σ. Results are shown for networks with different
secrecy outage constraints, i.e.,  = 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, as well as no secrecy
constraint, i.e.,  = 1. The other system parameters are r = 1, α = 4,
λl = 0.01, and λe = 0.001.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a new notion of secrecy
transmission capacity that was used to characterize the impact
of physical layer security requirements on the throughput
of large-scale decentralized wireless networks. We obtained
simple and tractable results for Rayleigh fading channels,
and gave a sufficient condition on the system parameters for
having positive secrecy transmission capacity. An important
observation is that the throughput cost of achieving a moderate
security level is relatively low, while it becomes very expensive
to realize a highly secure network. This model of secrecy
transmission capacity can be extended in future to analyze and
design networks with other transmission techniques, medium
access control protocols, and eavesdropping strategies.
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